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The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is among the most controversial
environmental laws in the United States.  Under Section 9 of the ESA, it is illegal to
destroy not just endangered species themselves, but also their habitat.  As a result, the
ESA is an impediment to many income producing uses of land that almost invariably
involve some change to the natural landscape
1 (Kennedy et. al.).  Most of the highest
profile conflicts about the ESA have involved public land management (e.g., the
Northern Spotted Owl), although the majority of endangered and candidate species
reside on private land (Mann and Plummer).  The issue of private landowner incentives
and the ESA is gaining more attention, and is likely to be at the center of future
reauthorizations and revisions to the law.
Both property rights advocates and many environmental groups agree that the
ESA does not provide adequate incentives to landowners to provide habitat for
endangered species.  Because landowners are restricted from many profitable uses of
their land when an endangered species locates on their property, it is in the best
interest of some landowners to eliminate suitable habitats before any endangered
species have an opportunity to settle on their land.  Furthermore, landowners may be
tempted to eliminate any endangered species currently residing on their land before
government officials are aware of their presence.  There are many proposals to amend
the ESA so as to better reconcile it with private land owner incentives such as rent
                                               
1 Under the 1982 revisions to the ESA, a landowner can acquire an incidental take
permit (where the taking of species or habitat is incidental to, and not the primary
purpose of the activity) provided they develop a habitat conservation plan designed topayments to landowners, tradable habitat conservation credits, and compensating
landowners for regulatory “takings.”  Empirical estimates of the importance and
magnitude of these private landowner disincentives are important to the development
of future ESA revisions.
One of the most contentious ESA conflicts involving private landowners is the
case of the red-cockaded woodpecker (RCW) and forest landowners in the South.
RCWs inhabit mature stands of southern pine which are highly valued for timber.  The
problem for landowners is that a single clan of woodpeckers, which includes a single
mating pair and up to seven "helpers," requires anywhere from 100 to 250 acres of
mature pine forest for nesting and foraging habitat (Hyde, Kennedy et. al.).  Thus, even
the presence of a very small number of woodpeckers requires a landowner to take
hundreds of acres out of timber production.
The objective of this paper is to estimate the extent to which landowners have
preemptively destroyed RCW habitat in order to avoid potential regulation under the
ESA.  While the research results are certainly of interest to the issue of the RCW and
southern forestland owners, it is also of importance to the larger issue of ESA revision
and reauthorization.  The literature is full of individual accounts of the costs of ESA
regulation and actions landowners have undertaken to avoid them (Mann and
Plummer), but there have been no systematic studies of the occurrence of these
effects on a large scale.
Forest Harvest Under the Possibility of Future ESA Regulation
A private landowner’s incentive to develop early when facing potential future
ESA regulation has been developed in game theoretic models by Innis and Polasky
                                                                                                                                           
mitigate the taking through appropriate conservation measures and habitat
enhancement.and Doremus.  While this paper can be thought of as an empirical test of these models,
this paper utilizes a classic Faustmann/Hartman model of optimal forest rotation since
the empirical application is timber harvesting.
2  The probability of future endangered
species settlement produces a minor change in the familiar first order condition of the
Faustmann model, where a forest owner chooses to harvest their timber when the
marginal benefit of waiting is equal to the marginal cost of waiting.  If W represents the
probability of future RCW settlement and subsequent land use regulations under the
















where G is the market value of the timber, R is the recreation value of standing timber, t
is the length of future timber rotations, and r is the interest rate.  Since W is less than 1,
it has the effect of reducing the expected benefit of waiting to harvest.  It is easy that
this results in an earlier harvest date than would exist in the absence of potential ESA
regulation.
FIA Data
The primary source of data is the periodic survey of the U.S. Forest Service,
Southern Research Station’s Forest Inventory and Analysis (FIA) group.  The FIA data
is detailed survey of timber, recreation, and other forest characteristics for
approximately 5000 randomly selected, forest plots in North Carolina at six to ten year
intervals (Lee, Newman and Wear).  Unfortunately, confidentiality agreements with the
landowners prevents the identification of the owner of any sampled plot or any of the
                                               
2  The author has developed a game theoretic model of the RCW case based on the work
of Innis and Polasky and Doremus and a model of the preemption incentive with a
household production model of timber supply based on the work of Binkley.  Because
the primary focus of this short paper is empirical, a brief Hartman model is utilizedowner’s characteristics.  However, the data does identify plots by ownership type
(government, private industrial , and private non-industrial) so that the management
behavior of these different ownership classes can be compared.
This study utilizes plots that were unmoved between the 1983-84 and 1989-90
surveys so that timber harvest and growth is calculated for each plot over the period
between the surveys.  The analysis is constrained to privately owned plots in the
Coastal Plain and Sandhills regions of North Carolina consisting of southern pine or a
mixed forest of both hardwoods and pines.  A total of 1,199 forest plots met the above
selection criteria which limits the analysis to forest stands with the potential to be future
RCW habitat and are within the RCW’s historical range.
Data on the latitude and longitude of each plot are available so that location can
be determined within about 1/2 mile (Lee).  This will be used in future research to
construct a detailed measure of local RCW density for each sample point using data on
RCW distribution from North Carolina State University’s School of Forestry and the Fish
and Wildlife Service.  However that data is not complete at this point, so the empirical
work uses the number of RCWs in the sample plot’s county as the measure of RCW
risk.  Figure 1 shows the number of known RCW sites in each North Carolina county as
of 1982.  Figure 1 is from an article (Carter, Stamps and Doerr) in the proceedings of
the 1983 Red-Cockaded Woodpecker Symposium, and is a good representation of
public knowledge about RCW distribution during the 1980s, the period the FIA data
represents.
                                                                                                                                           
because its familiarity allows for a concise specification of the preemption incentive.
Alternative theoretical specifications are available from the author upon request.Specifying Economic Variables
As discussed previously, a profit maximizing timber grower will harvest when the
marginal benefit of waiting another year (the dollar value of the next year’s growth) is
equal to the marginal cost of waiting (the interest that could be earned on the value of
the existing stand and future rotations).  These could be proxied by variables
representing forest stand characteristics such as age of the timber or volume of timber,
but these measures miss a lot of important components that go into the market value of
a timber stand.  Most importantly a tree is valued as different products as it grows, and
each of these products has a different price per board foot of timber.  For example,
softwoods five to nine inches in diameter is pulpwood, nine to eleven is chip-and-saw,
and greater than eleven inches is sawtimber, the most highly valued product (Lee).  A
stand with a given timber volume could either be a dense, low value stand of pulpwood
or a thinner stand of valuable sawtimber.  As a result, the value of a timber stand must
be calculated by merchandising each individual tree in the sample plot into one of five
product classes, each with a different price.
3
The value of stand i at a given time t, Vit, is the timber volume by product class,
Qj, times the price of that product.







Ideally, the marginal benefit of waiting would be calculated as the value of next year’s
growth, the year following the final survey.  This data is unavailable, but can be closely
approximated by the value of the average growth over the six year sample period.  This
amounts to assuming a linear growth curve which, although incorrect, is not a bad
                                               
3 The five product classes are softwood pulpwood, chip-and-saw, and sawtimber and
hardwood pulpwood and sawtimber.  Many thanks go to Karen Lee who provided the
FIA data in a user friendly form and had already gone through the tedious process ofapproximation since we are only considering a small portion of the total growth curve.
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The marginal cost of not cutting a stand this year, MCi, and be expressed as the
interest that could be earned this year on the present value of the existing stand plus


















where r is the market interest rate and T represents the length of future rotations.
Because a landowner is comparing marginal benefits and marginal costs when
making the harvest decision, the appropriate explanatory variable is the difference
marginal benefits and costs, MBi - MCi, rather than being included as two separate
explanatory variables.  A profit-maximizing timber owner chooses to wait when this
difference is positive, and chooses to harvest when the difference is negative.  Thus, a
negative sign is expected on the coefficient for this variable.
There are also physical characteristics of a site that affect the cost of timber
cutting and bear on the landowner’s harvest decision.  These characteristics include the
slope of a site and its accessibility.  The FIA data gives an estimate of the distance to
the nearest road for each sample plot which is used as a measure of the sites
accessibility for commercial timber harvesting.  Both variables, slope and accessibility,
are expected to yield negative coefficients.
                                                                                                                                           
merchandising each sample plot into a standing timber value for her own dissertationSpecifying RCW Settlement Risk
There are two important conditions that must exist for a currently unoccupied
forest to be a candidate for RCW settlement: 1) mature pines for habitat and 2) a
nearby colony of RCWs which could potentially relocate or have their offspring settle on
the forest tract.  For this analysis, the occurrence of nearby RCW colonies is
represented by the number of colonies in the sample plot’s county.  Since the analysis
is constrained to stands of southern pine, the first condition can be simply modeled by
the age of the stand.  However, this specification raises econometric problems because
stand age is highly correlated with the key economic variable, MB-MC.  To break the
correlation between the measure of RCW risk and MB-MC, an interaction term between
stand age and the number of RCW colonies in the county (AGE*RCWs) proxies for the
probability of RCW settlement.  The correlation coefficient between AGE*RCW and
MB-MC is 0.03.  The interaction variable has the desirable characteristic of only having
high values when both ingredients for RCW settlement are present.  The coefficient is
expected to be positive as the theoretical model predicts that forest owners with a high
probability of RCW colonization are more likely to harvest.  Future work should yield
more sophisticated approaches to measuring RCW risk that are uncorrelated with the
profit maximizing harvest condition.
Estimation Results
The probability of harvest is estimated with a separate logit model for industrial,
non-industrial private, and a pooled sample of all privately owned lands.  The
probability of harvest is modeled as a function of the difference between marginal
benefits and marginal costs, MB-MC, site slope, accessibility, and a variable
                                                                                                                                           
research.  The fine details of these calculations are in her dissertation.representing the probability of RCW distribution, RCWAGE, an interaction term
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The results of the logit estimation are shown in Table 1.
The results largely support the theoretical predictions.  MB-MC is negative and
significant for all ownership groups, although slope and accessibility are not significant
explanatory factors.  This in not surprising because most areas in the North Carolina
coastal plain are flat and relatively accessible, so these variables are not as important
as they might be in a more mountainous setting.  RCWAGE is positive and significant
for industrial land, and positive and insignificant for non-industrial owned land.  There
are several reasons to expect industrial landowners to be more responsive than non-
industrial owners to the probability of RCW settlement.  Previous studies suggest that
non-industrial landowners receive many non-timber benefits from their land (Hartman,
Binkley, Newman and Wear).  Because RCW settlement is primarily a threat to timber
revenue, industrial owners would be more responsive to the risk than non-industrial
owners for whom timber revenue is not the primary management objective.  It is
important to note that the data is from the 1980s, when the debate regarding the ESA
and private landowners was just beginning.  At this time, land managers for the forest
industry were likely to be much more aware of the potential risks of the ESA.  One
might expect to see a larger response from non-industrial landowners during the 1990s
as stories about RCW conflicts began to appear more frequently in the mainstream
media.
The magnitude of the coefficients can be put into perspective by examining the
model’s predicted probability of harvest for a 50 year old stand of pine in both a county
heavily populated with RCWs and a county with few RCWs.  Evaluating slope andaccessibility at their sample means, and using a simple regression to forecast the
predict the value of MB-MC for a 50 year old stand, the model predicts that an industrial
landowner in a low risk county (only 2 RCW groups) would have a probability of
harvesting of .37.  The same forest under industrial management in a highly populated
county (120 RCW colonies, the mean for the Sandhills counties) has a .80 probability
of harvest, an increase of 43%.  For all private landowners, including both industry and
non-industrial owned land, the probability of harvest only increases from .39 to .44.
These results indicate that fear of RCW colonization is spurring increased harvesting
on industrial lands, but is of minor importance for other ownership types.
Future extensions and improvements
Two primary extensions and improvements to the above analysis should be in
place prior to the August presentation in Salt Lake City.  The first is a similar empirical
analysis of preemptive harvest utilizing a mail survey of 2200 private forest owners in
North Carolina conducted between November 1997 and January 1998.  The data is
entered and ready to go, but the author is waiting on the detailed RCW data described
below before moving beyond descriptive analysis of the survey data.  The survey data
has several advantages over the FIA data.  First, it is more recent (the height of the
ESA controversy has been in the 1990s). Second, it contains more detailed information
on landowners and their recreational activities (e.g., hunting, bird watching). Third, it
has information on forest owners perceived risk of ESA regulation rather than relying
on scientific data of which landowners may not be aware in evaluating the probability of
RCW settlement on their own property.
In addition, both data sets will soon be enhanced with individualized measures
of RCW proximity for each landholding.  The locations of the 1,199 FIA sample plots
and approximately 1,000 survey respondents are being mapped in GIS along with thelocations of all known RCW colonies in North Carolina.  RCW colony counts within 5,
15, and 25 mile bands around each sample point will enable us to construct high
resolution forecasts of the probability of RCW settlement for use in the estimations of
the harvest model.
Conclusion
Many revisions to the ESA’s regulation of private landowners have been
proposed in anticipation of Congress’s upcoming reauthorization of the ESA.  The
proposals range from full or partial compensation of landowners, to tradable habitat
credits and Safe Harbor agreements (Kennedy et. al. 1996, Polasky and Doremus
1998, Stroup 1997, Thompson 1997).  The proposals vary widely in cost and the
degree to which they correct the incentive for preemptive habitat destruction.  By
examining the magnitude of preemptive harvesting under the current regulation, this
research will yield valuable new information to this important and current policy debate.
Preliminary estimates indicate significant preemptive harvesting on the part of industrial
forest owners in North Carolina.  Upcoming refinements to the empirical work should
yield a clearer picture.References
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Economic Policy.  15:55-65.Table 1.  Parameter estimates of the logit model for industrial, non-industrial and all
private landowners (standard errors in paranthesis.)
Variable Name Industry Land Non-Industrial All Private
INTERCEPT -1.5651*** -.9503*** -1.1542***
(.3670) (.2116) (.1806)
MB-MC -.0207*** -.0158*** -.0183***
(.00632) (.00265) (.00241)
SLOPE -.00413 -.00974 -.00210
(.0498) (.0223) (.0202)
ACCESSIBILITY .1944 .1344 .1760
(.2983) (.1628) (.1424)
RCWAGE .000333** .000014 .00004
(.000159) (.000042) (.000041)
N 352 847 1199
# harvested plots 82 303 385
-2 Log Liklihood 359.32 1058.27 1428.64
*** significant at the 1% level
** significant at the 5% level
* significant at the 10% level
Figure 2.  Numbers and distribution of red-cockaded woodpecker colony sites reported
in North Carolina in 1982. (Carter, Stamps and Doerr 1983)